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NOTES AND COMMENT
Constitutional Law: Constitutionality of Chapter 94, Session
Laws of Wisconsin for 1925, regarding substituted service on nonresidents.-A new subsection is added to section 85.15 of this state,
the statute (85.15-3) reading: "The use and operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle over the highways of Wisconsin shall be deemed
an appointment by such nonresident of the secretary of state to be his
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal processes
in any action or proceeding against him growing out of such use or
operation resulting in damage or loss to person or property, and said use
or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that any such
process against him which is so served shall be of the same legal force
and validity as if served on him personally. Service of such process
shall be made by serving a copy upon the secretary of state or by filing
such copy in his office, together with a fee of two dollars, and such
service shall be sufficient service upon the said nonresident; provided,
that notice of such service and a copy of the process are within ten days
thereafter sent by mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, at his last
known address and that the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith
is appended to the summons. The court in which the action is pending
may order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant
reasonable opportunity to defend the action, not exceeding ninety days
from the date of the filing of the action in such court. The fee of two
dollars paid by the plaintiff to the secretary of state at the time of the
service shall be taxed in his costs if he prevails in the suit. The secretary of state shall keep a record of all such processes which shall show
the day and hour of service."
This statute, if valid, is certainly a revolution in the method of obtaining jurisdiction of nonresident defendants in transitory actions.
Service by publication upon citizens of other states has been held
constitutional. The reasoning is well and concisely stated in Morris
v. Graham.' "It is beyond the power of a state to grant the same privileges and immunities in the matter of service of process to those outside of its jurisdiction as it can to those within its limits; its powers
are limited by its boundaries. All residents, or those found within its
limits, are to be served personally. All others who cannot be so reached
must necessarily be served by publication, both methods being regardless of their citizenship." It seems, at first glance, that such reasoning
should also sustain this new amendment to the statute.
It may well be argued, on the other hand, that this section of the
statute violates several United States constitutional provisions, namely:
Article 4, Section 2. "The citizens of. each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," and the
Fourteenth Amendment, Section I. "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
'51

Federal Rep. 57 (1892).
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of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
The first question to be considered is whether it violates the "privilege and immunities" clause of the United States Constitution. Statutes
enacted in Florida and Delaware very similar to the one under consideration have been held unconstitutional.
A Delaware statute provided "that whenever suit shall be brought
against any person or persons not residing in this state, but doing business therein, either by a branch establishment or agency, it shall be
sufficient service of a writ of summons to leave a copy thereof with
any agent, or at the usual place of business of such person or persons,
or his or her or their agent ten days before the return thereof." The
Superior Court of Delaware held this statute unconstitutional because
repugnant to Article 4, Section 2 of the United States Constitution,
giving the citizens of each state all the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states, in so far as it attempted by such manner
of service to confer money judgments, since it provided a mode of
serving process in personal actions on nonresidents essentially different
from that prescribed for residents.2 A Florida statute provided that
"inactions against an individual residing in another state, or a partnership, association, or joint stock company, the members of which reside
in another state, engaged in business in this state, the summons may be
served on the manager or agent of or person in charge of such business
in this state in the county where the business is carried on, or in the
county where the cause of action occurred." The Federal Court held
that a judgment in personam, obtained against a nonresident on a service
made upon an agent under the statute, violated the rights of the defendant by depriving him of an immunity or exemption allowed to
citizens of the several states. Citizens of a foreign state have entire
immunity from being subjected to personal judgments for money upon
such a service of process in actions at law.3
It may be noticed that the statute discriminates not between citizens
but between residents and nonresidents. The Supreme Court of Ohio
in an action in which the constitutionality of a statute, excluding from
the jurisdiction of the state courts of Ohio, all causes against the persons and companies therein referred to for injuries to person or property or for wrongful death occuring without the state of Ohio unless
such claimant is a resident of that state, ruled that the statute was not
unconstitutional because the purpose of the constitution is to prevent
arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination in each state in favor of its
own citizens and against the citizens of other states, and since this
statute discriminated only between residents and nonresidents it was
constitutional. This is the only case making such a distinction, however, and a number of cases can be found where statutes discriminating
2

Caldwell v. Armour, (899)

'Moredock v. Kirby,

(1902)

I Penn. (Del) 545. 43 Atl. Rep. 517.
II8 Fed. Rep. 182.
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between residents and nonresidents and not between citizens and noncitizens have been held unconstitutional. 4
The statute reads: "The use and operation by a nonresident of a
motor vehicle over the highways of Wisconsin shall be deemed an
appointment by such nonresident of the secretary of state to be his true
and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process." It is
very plain that this provision is modeled after the provision that corporations by doing business within the state constitute the secretary of
state their agent for the service of process. This presents the question
as to whether every nonresident who uses our highways, assents to the
secretary of state becoming his agent for the service of process, a question which must be answered in the negative, A corporation of one
state cannot do business in another state without the latter's consent,
expressed or implied, and that consent may be accompanied by such
conditions as it may think proper to impose, because a corporation is
not a person within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amexidment.5 The circumstances under which a
natural person, a citizen of another state, carries on business or uses
the highways in this state, are essentially different. He uses the roads
here, not by virtue of the consent of this state, but by virtue of a right
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States; and from the
-exercise of that right no assent can be implied that he will submit to a
mode of service in personal actions different from that provided in case
of citizens of this state.6
The next question to be considered is whether the statute violates
the constitutional provision that no state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In other words,
the specific question is whether the provision for substituted service
upon the secretary of state with a mailing of notice of service to the
defendant is due process and will give the court jurisdiction of an action
in personam. Such a service has been held to be due process in the case
.of foreign corporations.7 In the case of domestic corporations and citizens of the state it is a question as to how far substituted or constructive
.service will be allowed. Wisconsin holds that a statute authorizing
service of summons on corporations which neglect to file lists of the
names of officers on whom process might be served, by leaving copies
with the register of deeds where the corporation has its principal office.
is invalid as not providing due process of law. s Service is allowed upon
residents in this state, however, by leaving the summons with a member
of the defendant's family of suitable age and discretion at his usual
place of abode, and by publication in case the defendant departs from
'Loftus v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., i6 Ohio App. 371,

1O7

Ohio State 352,

14o N.E. 94.

'St. Clair v. Cox. io6 U. S. 350, 27 L. ed. 222.
' Ins. Co. ,. French, 18 Hos. 404.
Societe Fonciere et Agricole des Estate Univ. s,. Milliken, 138 U. S. 304, 34L.
.ed. 208, Sec. 2637 (13) Wis. Stats., io Sup. Ct. Rep. 823.
'N. C. Pinney v. Providence Loan and Investment, io6 Wis. 396. 82 N.W. 308.
.SeC. 2637 (3) Wis. Stats.
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the state or conceals himself within the state with intent to defraud his
creditors.9
In case of nonresidents, a judgment obtained in an action in personam
where there has only been substituted or constructive sei-vice provided
by statute upon the defendant, has never been held valid in other jurisdictions, other than that in which it was rendered although held to be
And the case of Pennoyer v. Neff (877) 95 U.S. 714,
valid there.'
24 L. ed. 565, has been uniformly regarded as placing beyond question
the doctrine that a personal judgment against a nonresident who was
not served within the state, and who did not appear or assent, expressly
or impliedly, to the mode of constructive or substituted service adopted,
is invalid, even in the state where rendered."In the face of the authorities and the doctrine of stare decisis it is
very improbable that this chapter 94 of the session laws of 1925 will
be upheld as constitutional. This is most regrettable, for there is no
doubt the result sought to be accomplished by this statute is highly
desirable.
EVERETT P. DOYLE
Courts: Contrasting the exterior features of the English and
American courts.-One often hears, from interested American lawyers, questions regarding the external forms surrounding the administration of British justice. It is a subject which intrigues the average
attorney, partly because of our heritage of the English common law, and
partly because of lack of cultural, educational, and social understanding
between the two countries.
The differences between the administration of justice in the British
Empire and this country may be said to consist chiefly of ceremony,
dignity, and atmosphere. British courts have about them an elusive
aroma of medievalism, archaic, yet pleasing, which would be almost
theatrical were it not for the background of centuries which support it.
American courts, less formal, contrive to combine dignity with the
urgent dispatch of business.
The English court room is, on the average, smaller and less ostentatious than the American. The decoration usually follows the squat
lines of Anglo-Saxon Gothic, rather than the classic purity of most
American public buildings. The judges' throne, a most imposing piece
of furniture, is always placed at that end of the room which faces the
formal entrance. It is occasionally surmounted by a canopy. Either
the throne or canopy invariably supports the royal coat of arms, symbol
of'authority, approximated in this country by the American flag.
In the space or "well" in front of the judicial dais are the barrister
benches, and one is struck by the absence of tables. The jury box to
'Secs. 2636 (4), 2639 (2), Wis. Stats.
10 Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 21 L. ed. 959; Thompson v. Emmett, 4 McLean,
96 Fed. Cos No. 12, 953.
"Llitz v. Kelly, 47 Iowa 307; Eliot v. McCormick, 144 Mass. io, io N.E. 705;
McKinney v. Collins, 88 N. Y. 217.

